Understanding the Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Overview by 椋 寛 & Mukunoki Hiroshi
Bulletin　of　Gakushuin　University　Research　lnstitute　of　Economics　and　Management，　No．19，　December，200531
Understanding　the　Effects　of　Preferential　Trade　Agreements：
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A　Theoretical　Overview
　　　　　　　　　　　　Hiroshi　Mukunoki
凡ZC吻・ρブEconomiCS，　Gakushuin　University
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Abstract
　　In　recent　years，　the　number　of　preferential　trade　agreements（PTAs）increases　rapidly．　In　tan－
dem　with　the　evolution　of　the　new　trade　theory，　the　economic　ana豆ysis　of　PTAs　has　also　been
developed　drastically．　This　paper　intends　to　organize　a　complicated　mass　of　existing　theories　of
PTAs　and　places　special　emphasis　on　their　relationship　with　multilateral　trade　liberalization．
Some　new　topics　such　as　the　effects　of　intemal　market　integration　or　those　of　rules　of　origin　are
also　discussed．
1　　1ntroduction
In　recent　years，　the　world　trading　system　has　experienced　a　remarkable　and　worldwide　proliferation　of
Preferential　Trade　Agreements（PTAs）．　PTAs　that　are　noticed　in　fbrce　to　the　General　Agreement　on　Tariffs
and　Trade（GATT）and　its　successor，　the　World　Trade　Organization（WTO），　increased　rapidly　from　l　990s
（see　Figure　l）．1　As　for　the　scope，　almost　all　WTO　members　were　participating　in　one　or　more　PTAs　at　the
end　of　2004．　The　deepened　integration　and　the　expanding　membership　of　the　European　Union（EU），　the
North　American　Free　Trade　Agreement（NAFrA），　the　South　American　Common　Market（MERCOSUR），　the
Australia－New　Zealand　Closer　Economic　Relations　Trade　Agreement（ANZCERTA）are　major　examples．
While　the　Asian　nations　have　taken　a　passive　attitude　towards　PTAs　until　recently，　they　have　begun　to　con－
clude　many　bilateral　agreements　with　the　anival　of　the　new　century．
　　Preferential　trade　agreements（PTAs）are　agreements　by　which　participating　countries　discriminatorily
relnove　trade　barriers　among　their　countries，　with　protection　against　nonparticipants　being　maintained．2　The
?The　first　agreement　was山e　1957　Treaty　of　Rome　to　form　the　European　Economic　Comm鵬（EEC）．　It　went　into　e鰍t血1958．
Many　temls　are　used　to　represent　the　same　type　of　agreements．　The　WTO　refers　to　them　as　Regional　Trade　Agreements
（RTAs）．　They　are　also　often　referred　to　as　Reglonal　Integration　Arrangements（RIAs），　Regional　Trading　Blocs（or　trad－
ing　blocs），　or　as　Regional　Economic　Integra口on．　Many　recent　agreements　have　been　concluded　between　coun面es　not　in
geographical　proxim玉ty，　and　the　recent　wave　of　overlapping　FrAs　should　be　considered　as　networks　of　countdes，　rather
than　the‘‘blocs”of　countries．　Hence，　this　study　adopts　the　term‘‘preferential”and‘‘agreements”rather　than　regional”
and“blocs”Jn　this　article，　however，　we　sometimes　use　those　terms　interchangeably．
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Figure　1：PTAs　in　force　by　date　of　entry　into　force（Source：WTO　Secretariat）
GATTバVTO　defines　three　basic　categories　of　regional　trade　agreements：Free　Trade　Area（FrA），　Customs
Union（CU），　and　interim　agreements　to　implement　FI’As　or　CUs．　A　Free　Trade　Area（FrA），　or　a　Free　Trade
Agreement，　is　a　PTA　in　which　each　member　country　independently　sets　its　own　external　tariff　against　non－
members．　A　Customs　Union（CU）is　a　PTA　where　member　countries　set　a　common　extemal　tariff（CET）．
The　NAFTA　and　European　Free　Trade　Association（EFTA）are　examples　of　FrAs．　The　EU　and　MERCO－
SUR　are　examples　of　CUs．
　　Although　discriminatory　policies　violate　the　Most－Favored－Nations（MFN）principle　in　the　GATTIWTO，
PTAs　are　admitted　as　an　exception　under　Article　XXIV　of　the　GATT．　The　Article　states　conditions　under
which　members　of　GATTバVTO　may　fbrm　PTAs．　The　main　conditions　are：（i）trade　barriers　against　non－
members　must　not　be　higher　than　pre－PTA　levels　on　the　whole，（ii）members　must　eliminate　trade　barriers
among　members　on‘substantially　all　trade’，（iii）interim　agreements　to　schedule　the　process　of　internal　trade
liberalization　must　be　completed　within　a　reasonable　time．
　　During　the　period　1985－2005，　countries　also　engaged　in　multilateral　trade　liberalization　in　the　negotiation
round　of　the　GATTバVTO．　The　members　of　GATTバVTO　have　experienced　long－standing　trade　negotiations
under　the　Uruguay　Round（1986－1994），　the　establishment．　of　the　WTO（January　1995），　the　breakdown　in
negotiations　in　the　WTO　Seattle　Ministerial　Conference（November　l999），　the　launch　of　the　Doha
Development　Agenda（2001－），　and　so　on，　The　proliferation　of　PTAs　around　the　world，　which　has　occurTed　in
tandem　with　the　development　of　a　multilateral　regime　in　trade　cooperation，　has　led　to　an　interest　in　the　eco－
nomic　effects　of　this　proliferation　as　well　as　its　implications　for　the　world　trading　system．　A　concem　about
PTAs　has．been　that　they　may　become　a“fortress”，　amplif頭ade　protection，　and　undermine　the　multilateral
trading　system．　A　positive　view　has　also　been　expressed，　namely，　that　PTAs　can　be　stepping　stones　to　realize
worldwide　trade　liberalization．　To　make　a　judgment，　extensive　economic　analyses　are　essential．　What　are　the
effects　of　PTAs？Do　they　harm　countries　outside　PTAs？Are　there　differences　between　FrAs　and　CUs？
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Under　what　conditions　does　a　proliferation　of　PTAs　promote　f．urther　trade　liberalization？These　are　questions
that　have　been　addressed　in　the　literature．
　　Theoretical　investigation　of　PTAs　has　a　history　of　more　than　half　a　century。　This　paper　gives　a　short
review　of　the　theory　of　PTAs，　with　a　focus　on　the　topics　that　most　concem　the　analysis　provided　in　the
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2The　traditional　theory
2．1　Trade　creation　and　trade　diversion
The　traditional　theories　of　PTAs　mainly　examine　the　static　effects　of　PTAs．　A　seminal　work，　Viner（1950），
introduces　a　concept　of‘‘trade　creation”and‘‘trade　diversion”and　shows　that　if　the　partner　countries　are　less
effbient　than　those　outside　the　PTA，　the　fbrnlation　of　a　PTA　causes　members’welfare　to　deteriorate　if　their
respective　external　tariffs　are　maintained．　Meade（1955）and　Lipsey（1957）generalize　Viner’s　result，　and
show　that　even　if　PTAs　are　trade－diverting，　they　may　improve　member’s　welfare　since　a　benefit　from　less
distorted　consumption　can　outweigh　the　loss　of　production　effciency．4　Corden（1972）introduces　scale
economies　and　shows　that　the　concepts　of　trade　creation　and　trade　diversion　are　still　relevant，　but　there　are
additional　effects　stemming　from　cost　reduction　by　production　specialization．
　　In　the　case　of　a　large　country，　the　f6rmation　of　FTAs　also　infiuences　terms　of　trade　among　countries．
Mundell（1964）shows　that，　even　if　external　tariffs　are　unchanged　before　and　after　the　formation　of　a　PTA，
the　PTA　may　have　the　beggar－thy－neighbor　effect　by　improving　terms　of　trade　for　member　countries　vis－h－
vis　nonmelnbers．　This　is　because，　as　long　as　goods　are　substitutes，　the　increased　trade　among　member　coun－
tries　win　dectease　demand　fbr　goods　originating　outside　the　PTAs，　and　the　world　price　of　those　goods　will
have　to　fall　in　order　to　clear　the　market．　The　same　result　is　obtained　in　the　monopolistic　competition　model
（see　for　instance，　Goto　and　Hamada，1999）．　In　fact，　Winters　and　Chang（2000）and　Chang　and　Winters
（2002）provide　evidenc6s　that　the　creation　of　a　PTA　is　associated　with　declines　in　the　prices　of　nonmembers’
exports　to　the　region．5
2．2　APareto－improving　PTA
Thus，　a　Pareto－improving　PTA　requires　a（恥stments　of　external　tariffs　to　eliminate　the　terms　of　trade
changes．　Vanek（1965）states，　and　Ohyama（1972）and　Kemp　and　Wan（1976）prove　that　a　CU　that　elimi一
??
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Baldwin　and　Venables（1995），　Panagariya（2000），　and　Krishna（2005）provide　a　more　detailed　survey　of　the　literature．
Thus，　the　trade－creation　and　the　trade－diversion　taxonomy　cannot　provide　strictly　accurate　results　on　the　welfare　implica－
tions　of　PT’As．　Kowalczyk（2000）disaggregates　the　welfare　changes　in　general　equilibrium　models　under　perfect　compe－
tition　into　terms－of－trade　effect　and　volume－of－trade　effect．　Furusawa　and　Konishi（2004）propose　a　new　decomposition
of　welfare　effects　when　consumers　have　quasi－linear　utility　functions．　They　suggest　that　social　welfare　is　decomposed
into　the　sum　of　consumers’gross　utilities　and　trade　surplus　of　nonnumeraire　commodities．　The　latter　decomposition　is
applicab且e　to　economies　under　imperfect　competition　with　constant－retums－to－scale　production　technologies．
Wintes　and　Chang（2000）show　that　when　Spain　joined　the　EC，　prices　of　its　imports　from　OECD　countries　fell，　while
Chang　and　Winters（2002）show　that　the　creation　of　MERCOSUR　has　had　the　same　result．
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nates　internal　trade　barriers　and　sets　its　common　external　tariff　to　fix　a　net　trade　vector　with　outside　countries
necessarily　improves　the　welfare　of　the　CU　as　a　whole　and　does　not　hurt　the　outside　countries．6　Wi山acom－
pensation　scheme　within　the　union，　every　individual　member　is　better　off（or　no　worse　off）and　it　is　always
feasible　if山e　compensation　to　each　member　is　determined　by　its　pre－union　trade　vector（Grinols，1981）．　The
argument　is　also　applicable　to　CU　formation　under　impe㎡fect　competition．　For　example，　Long　and　Soubeyran
（1997）prove　the　existence　of　the　Vanek－Ohyama－Kemp・Wan　tariff　under　Coumot　oligopoly．
　　As　fbr　FrAs，　Panagariya　and　Krishna（2002）prove　the　existence　of　a　Pareto－improving　FrA，　f（）r　which
net　trade　vectors　of　individual　members　are　fixed　at　the　pre－FrA　level　and　Rules　of　Origin（ROOs）are　set　to
prevent　transshipment　of　goods　from　a　low　extemal－tariff　country　to　a　high　extemal－tariff　country．
3　Endogenous　external　tariffs
Although　traditional　analysis　proved　the　existence　of　Pareto－improving　PTAs　with　the　a（ljustment　of　external
tariffs，　this　does　not　automatically　mean　countries　have　incentives　to　set　Pareto－improving　tariffs．　Many　stud－
ies　have　examined　the　endogenous　determination　of　external　tariffs，　when　members　set　them　to　maximize
their　individual　social　welfare．
3．1　　FTA　vs．　CU
In　general，　members　of　a　CU　set　a　common　external　tal　iff　that　is　higher　than　the　external　tariffs　of　an　FrA
set　by　individual　members．　Whenever　two　member　countries　import　the　same　good，　increase　in　the　extemal
tariff　of　one　member　benefits　not　only　producers　of　the　tariff－increasing　country，　but　also　producers　of　the
other　members．　Since　a　CU　must　set　a　common　external　tariff，　members　are　able　to　internalize　the　extemality
and　the　equilibrium　extemal　tariff　becomes　higher　than　that　of　an　FTA．　The　effect　is　referred　to　as　the　exter－
nality－internalizing　effect（Kennan　and　Riezman，1990）．　The　opposite　result　is　obtained　by　Panagariya　and
Findlay（1996）and　Richardson（1994b），　who　argue　that　because　of　the　free－rider　problem　in　lobbying　activi－
ties，　the　extemahariffs　of　CUs　are　lower　than　those　of　FrAs．
　　As　fbr　the　comparison　with　the　pre－PTA　leve1，　members　of　an　FrA　would　set　extemal　tariffs　below　the
pre－FrA　level．　Compared　to　a　nondiscriminatory　increase　in　tariffs，　a　discriminatory　tariff　increase　promotes，
rather　than　prevents，　imports　from　the　FTA　partner．　As　a　result，　the　tariff　elasticity　of　import　demands
becomes　lower，　reducing　the　optimal　level　of　tariffs　towards　nonmembers．　This　eff¢ct　is　referred　to　as　the
tarilff－complementarity　effect（Bagwell　and　Staiger，1999）．　The　trade－liberalizing　nature　of　FTAs　is　also　sug－
gested　by　Richardson（1993）in　a　different　mechanism．　He　shows　in　a　political－economy　model　that　a　trade
diversion　by　an　FTA　contracts　domestic　ineffcient　industry　and　reduces・the　support　fbr　high　protection
against　nonmembers．　Richardson（1995）also　argues　that　the　formation　of　an　FTA　brings　about　indirect　trade
deflection，　the　redirection　of　internal　goods　from　domestic　sales　in　low－tariff　members　to　exports　to　high－tar－
iff　members．　The　trade　deflection　induces　tariff－revenue　competition　among　member　countries，　and　leads　to
6　Thus，　if　import　barricrs　against　nonmembers　take　the　form　of　quotas　and　they　are　initially　binding，　CU　formation　does　not
　　　hurt　nonmembers（Yeh，1998）．
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lower　external　tariffs．7
　　Whether　the　CET　of　a　CU　exceeds　the　pre－CU　tariffs　is，　on　the　other　hand，　uncertain　and　it　depends　on　the
relative　magnitude　of　two　opposing　effects：the　externality－internalizing　effect　and　the　tariff－complementarity
effect．　Krugman（1991）shows　that　the　formation　of　CUs　leads　to　higher　extemal　tariffs　in　the　context　of　a
monopolistic　competition　model．　Syropoulos（1999）uses　a　model　in　which　trade　patterns　are　based　on　com－
parative　advantage　and　shows　that　the　optimal　CET　may　be　lower　than　the　pre－CU　level．
　　What　is　more　important　are　the　welfare　consequences　of　external　tariff　changes。　Surprisingly，　almost　all
previous　analyses　have　shown　that　the　tariff．－complementarity　effect　is　large　enough　to　make　the　equilibrium
extemal　tariffs　of　FTAs　below　the　Kemp．Wan（or　Panagariya－Krishna）tariff（e．g．，　Bagwell　and　Staiger，
1999；Yi，2000；Bond，　Riezman，　and　Syropoulos，2004）．　Thus，　the　FrA　with　endogenously　detemined　exter－
nal　tariffs　benefits　both　members　and　nonmembers．　Omelas（2005）shows　that　the　Pareto－improving　nature
of　FrAs　is　amplified　rather　than　reduced　when　governments　have　political　motivations　and　are　significantly
concemed　about　producers’interests．　The　CU　with　an　endogenously　determined　common　external　tariff，　on
the　other　hand，　usually．hurts　nonmember　countries（Kennan　and　Riezman，1990；Yi，1996；Kose　and
Riezman，2000）．　Even　if　Article　XXIV　of　the　GATT　restrains　CU　members　from　raising　their　common　exter－
nal　tariff，　the　CU　constitutes　a　beggar－thy－neighbor　effect，　irrespective　of　whether　the　constraint　is　binding　or
not（Syropoulos，1999）．
3．2　Reactions　from　nonmembers
Changes　in　extema1　tariffs　may　provoke　reactions　from　nonmembers．　Previous　analyses　suggest　that　external
tariffs　of　PTAs　are　strategic　substitutes　fbr　nonmembers’tariffs．　This　is　because　an　increase　in　the　extemal
tariff　of　a　PTA　reduces　the　PTA’s　import　demands　fbr　goods　produced　outside　the　PTA，　thereby　increasing
price　elasticity　of　import　demands　and　mitigating　outside　countries’market　powers　in　world　trade．　By　com－
bining　with　the　afbrementioned　result　that　members　of　an　FrA　reduce　extemal　tariffs，　it　is　anticipated　that
nonmembers　of　FrAs　will　behave　more　aggressively　in　their　tariff　determinations　whereas　those　of　CUs　may
or　may　not　increase　their　tariffs．　In　fact，　Kennan　and　Riezman（1990）show　by　nulnerical　examples　that　a
nonmember　increases　tariffs　in　the　case　of　FrA　formation　and　decreases　tariffs　in　the　case　of　CU　formation．
Gatsios　and　Kalp（1991）suggest　that　the　members　of　a　CU　can　be　better　off　by　delegating　the　tariff－setting　to
the　more‘aggressive’member．　Bond　et　aL（2004）show　that　members　of　an　FrA　may　experience　welfare
loss　since　the　loss　from　the　nonmember’s　tariff－increase　is　large　enough　to　offset　gains　from　FrA　fommation．
　　In　summary，　when　extemal　tariffs　are　endogenously　determined，　Pareto－improvement　fbllowing　the　fbr－
mation　of　a　PTA　depends　on　the　type　of　PTA，　and　it　is　more　likely　when　the　PTA　is　an　FrA．　FrAs　may，
however，　backfTire　in　that　they　lead　to　aggressive　reactions　from　nonmembers　and　harm　member　countries．
7 Cadot，　de　Melo，　and　Olaπeaga（1999）model　political　process　explicitly　a　la　Grossman　and　Helpman（1994）and　show　the
intra－bloc　trade　deflection　reduces　the　lobby’s　influence　on　the　trade　policy　and　makes　extemal　tariffs．of　an　FTA　lower
than　those　of　a　CU．
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4　The　decision　to　form　PTAs
As　is　shown　above，　traditional　literature　suggests　that　fbrmation　of　a　PTA　may　or　may　not　increase　welfare
of　member　countries，　and　a　welfare－reducing　PTA　is　more　Iikely　when　the　exporters　of　partner　countries　are
less　effcienしIn　either　case，　however，　the　firsレbest　policy　for　a　country　seems　to　be　to　pursue　free　trade　rather
than　to　fbml　a　PTA．　In　fact，　Johnson（1965）and　Cooper　and　Massell（1965）show　that　a　policy　of　nondis－
cdminato1y，　unilateral　tariff　reduction　is　superior　to　discriminatory　reforms．　They　suggest　that　discriminatory
arrangements　can　be　justified　only　by　noneconomic　o切ectives（the　Johnson－Cooper－Massell　proposition）．
Although　Wonnacott　and　Wonnacott（1981）argue　that　reciprocal　tariff　reduction　by　a　partner　or　the　exis－
tence　of　transport　costs　may　justify　the　superiority　of　a　CU　over　unilateral　tariff　reduction，　the　CU　is　never－
theless　dominated　by　multilateral　free　trade　in　their　model。
　　Thus，　the　theory　of　PTAs　is　inherently　of　a　second－best　nature．　PTAs　can　improve　national　welfare　when
the　economy　begins　at　an　equilibrium　in　which　the　market　has　distortions　or　imperf¢ctions．　The　presence　of
market　imperfections　or　distortions　being　presumed，　exploration　of　why　countries　choose　to　fbrm　PTAs　or
who　they　will　choose　as　partners　have　been　the　central　questions　of　the　modern　theories　of　PTAs．
4．t　Terms　of　trade　externality
The　existence　of　monopoly　power　at　country　level，　namely　the　existence　of　the　temis　of　trade　effect，　provides
one　explanation．　Riezman（1985）integrates　the　optimal　tariff　theory　and　countries’coalition　formation　deci－
sions　between　three　countries．　A　CU　can　be　an　equilibrium　even　when　all　members　would　have　higher　wel－
fare　with　free　trade．　As　is　shown　in　Kennan　and　Riezman（1988），　a　big　country　could　earn　higher　welfare　in
optimal　tariff　equilibrium　than　that　attained　in　free　trade　equilibrium．　Small　countries　become‘big’by　fbrm－
ing　a　CU　and　vie　with　the　big　country．　As　a　result，311　countries　become　worse　off　than　with　free　trade．　A　CU
intensifies　the　tariff　war　and　yields　an　outcome　like　the　Prisoners’Dilemma　game．　There　is　also．　a　case　in
which　all　members　benefit　from　a　CU　relative　to　free　trade　if　countries　are　of　similar　size．　This　approach　is
also　developed　by　Kennan　and　Riezman（1990），　and　their　results　are　examined　in　different　settings（see　Kose
and　Riezman，2000；Abrego，　Riezman，　Whalley，2004）．
4．2　1mperfect　competition　　　　　　．
Another　explanation　is　the　existence　of　monopoly　power　at　firm　level．　As　in　the　standard　literature　of　strate－
gic　trade　policy，　PTA　formation　may　have　a　rent－shifting　effect　under　intemational　monopoly　or　oligopoly．
The　distributive　effect　makes　PTAs　attractive　fbr　each　country．　Kiyono（1993）and　Raff（2001）consider　a
country’s　choice　of　partners。　In　contrast　to　the　Vinerian　scenario，　both　papers　show　that　countries　with　the
higher　marginal　costs　of　production　are　chosen　as　partners．　It　has　been　suggested　that，　when　there　are　more
than　two　countries　exponing　the　same　good，　an　importing　country　has　an　incentive　to　impose　higher　tariffs
on　imports　from　low－cost　countries　since　it　can　extract　more　monopoly　rents　from　exporting　firms（Gatsios，
1990）．The　MFN　principle　of　GATTrWTO　precludes　such　a　tariff　discrimination，　but　countries　are　allowed
to　do　so　by　PTAs．　Although　member　countries　become　better　off，　the　world　welfare　becomes　worse　off　with
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the　ineffcient　PTAs．
4．3　Politically　motivated　policy　makers
The　other　explanation　of　PTA　formation　is　the　existence　of　politically　motivated　policy　makers．　Even　though
free　trade　generally　maximizes　welfare　of　every　country，　it　may　hurt　specific　individuals　about　which　policy－
makers　have　particular　concem．　In　this　case，　PTAs　can　be　chosen　to　remove　or　to　mitigate　the　loss　of　special
interest　groups．　Grossman　arid　Helpman（1995）show　that　in　a　perfect　competition　model　an　FrA　is　most
likely　to　be　feasible　when　trade　between　members　is　balanced，　tariff　levels　are　similar，　and　particularly　when
trade　diversion　outweighs　trade　creation．　In　their　model，　governments　are　infiuenced　by　political　contribu－
tions　from　lobbies　representing　production　sectors．　Krishna（1998）uses　an　imperfect　competition　model　and
also　finds　that　trade－diverting　PTAs　are　more　likely　to　be　adopted　when　govemments　care　only　about　profits
of　domestic　producers．　Panagariya　and　Duttagupta（2002）extend　Grossman　and　Helpman（1995）model　and
sh6w　that　an　FTA　that　is　rejected　by　one　of　the　countries　under　a　tariff　may　be　feasible　under　a　voluntary
export　quota　or　an　import　quota　for　a　given　level　of　initial　protection．
4．4　Krugman’s　simulation
Putting　it　all　together，　countries　tend　to　form　a　PTA　when　the　PTA　increases　the　monopoly　power　of　member
countries　in　world　trade，　or　generates　a　rent－shifting　effect　to　some　domestic　industries．　The　latter　effect　is
important　when　there　are　imperfectly　competitive　industries　or　governments　are　politically　motivated．
Clearly，　the　relative　attractiveness　of　PTAs　compared　to　free　trade　derives　from　their　discriminatory　nature，
From　this　standpoint，　the　recent　increase　in　PTAs　seems　to　shake　the　foundations　of　the　world　trading　sys－
・tem．　Actually，　Krugman（1991）shows　that　world　welfare　is　minimized　when　the　number　of　symmetric　blocs
is　three，　which　indicates　that　the　current　trends　of　expanding　European　integration，　a　move　towards　a　Free
Trade　Area　of　the　Americas（FTAA），　and　growing　connections　among　East　Asian　nations　brings　about　the
WOrSt－CaSe　SCenariO。8
　　The　striking　result　of　Knlgman（1991）sets　off　a　debate　on　the　impact　of　PTAs　on　the　stability　of　the　world
trading　system．　SpecificalIy，　most　of　the　recent　analyses　argue　over　whether　the　proliferation　of　PTAs　helps
or　hampers　the　ongoing　process　of　trade　liberalization　in　the　world．　The　conventional　static　settings　are　inad－
equate　to　answer　the　question，　and　dynamic　perspectives　that　explicitly　incorporate　the　process　of　preferen－
tial　trade　liberalization　as　well　as　the　feasibility　of　multilateral　trade　liberalization　are　needed．　The　next　sec－
tion　reviews　the　results　of　recent　studies　on　the“dynamic　time－path”issue．
8 Krugman（1991）simultaneously　divides　the　world　¢onsisting　of　N　countries　into　blocs　with　symmetric　size．　Even　if　the
symmetric　blocs　are　sequentially　formed，　Krugman’s　result　still　holds（see　Haveman，1996）．　Bond　and　Syropoulos
（1996a）allow　asymmetry　in　bloc　size．　They　examine　the　welfare　consequence　of　the　expansion　of　one　trading　bloc　by
drawing　members　symmetrically　from　the　other　trading　blocs，　and　show　that　the　large　bloc　realizes　welfare　above　the
free－trade　level　at　the　expense　of　the　small　blocs．　World　welfare　may　increase　monotonically　with　the　expansion，　though
the　welfare　of　members　of　the　large　bloc　may　not．
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5　The　dynamic　time－path　analysis
While　economists　of　this　field　have　reached　a‘multilateral　agreement’over　static　effects　of　PTAs，　much　con－
troversy　exists　over　the　dynamic　time－path　issue　of　PTAs　proposed　by　Bhagwati（1．993）．　Some　think　that
PTAs　slow　down　or　even　stop　the　process　of　multilateral　liberalization．　Others　believe　that　they　facilitate
worldwide　free　trade　when　multilateral　negotiations　of　trade　Iiberalization　fail　to　reach　an　agreement．　In
Bhagwati’sphrases，　the　former　are　called‘‘stumbling　blocks”and　the　latter‘‘building　blocks”．
5．1　Stumbling　blocks　by　new　membership
To　date，　the　dynamic　time－path　issue　has　been　analyzed　in　many　papers．　Overa11，　theoretical　studies　incline
toward　the　view　that　PTAs　are　likely　to　undermine　the　attainment　of　multilateral　trade　liberahzation．
Burbidge，　DePater，　Myers，　and　Sengupta（1997）show　that　because　of　terms　of　trade　improvement　for　mem－
bers，　multilateral　free　trade　may　not　be　an　equilibrium　coalition　structure　even　if　international　transfers　are
possible．　In　an　oligopoly　model，　Yi（1996）shows　that　although　expansion　of　a　customs　union　leads　to　multi－
lateral　free　trade　under　the　open〃iembership　rule，　under　which　every　country　is　able　to　participate　in　a　bloc　if
it　wants，　free　trade　is　stopped　under　the　unanimous〃ze〃zbership　rule，　that　is，　all　countries　included　must
share　a　mutual　interest　in　the　fbrmation　or　expansion　of　the　bloc．　Because　of　the　rent－shifting　effects　of　PTAs
under　an　intemational　oligopoly，　incumbent　members　may　oppose　the　inclusion　of　potential　new　members．
In　a　monopolistic　competition　model，　Goto　and　Hamada（1999）show．　that　sequential　participation　in　a　PTA
may　stop　even　if　the　Ievel　of　extemal　tariffs　is　constrained　by　Article　XXIV　of　the　GATT．　McLaren（2002）
argues　that　expectation　of　the　fbrmation　of　a　future　PTA　induces　irreversible　regional　specialization　by　sunk
investment　of　private　agents，　reducing　the　ex　post　gains　from　multilateral　liberalization．
　　The　political　economy　of　trade　policy　also　magnifies　concerns　of　PTAs　becoming　stumbling　blocs．　In　a
median－voter　framework，　Levy（1997）shows　that　initially　feasible　multilateral　free　trade　becomes　infeasible
with　a　PTA．　He　integrates　the　Hecksher－Ohlin　model　and　a　monopolistic　competition　model　that　is　based　on
consumers’love　of　variety．　A　PTA　among　countries　with　similar　capital－1abor　ratios　provides　large　variety
gains　for　all　member　countries　keeping　losses　of　voters　from　income　redistribution　minimal．　Then，　the　subse－
quent　multilateral　liberalization　becomes　unattractive　since　gains　from　greater　variety　are　limited，　In　an
oligopoly　model，　Krishna（1998）assumes　govemments’concems　only　about　producers’profits　and　shows
that　a　PTA　lowers　incentives　fbr　multilateral　liberalization，　since　discriminatory　liberalization　by　the　PTA
works　as　a　device　to　extract　rents　f沁m　nonmembers’producers　and　the　redistributive　effect　may　dominate
gains　from　free　access　to　nonmembers’markets．
　　Yi（2000）and　Omelas（2005）show　that　nonmembers　may　also　withdraw　their　support　fbr　a　multilateral
agreement　if　the　PTA　takes　the　fbrm　of　an　FrA．　In　their　models，　external　tariffs　are　endogenously　deter－
mined　and　each　member　of　an　FI’A　sufficiently　reduces　its　own　external　tariffs　to　the　level　that　benefits　non－
members．　Consequently，　the　nonmembers’extra　gains　from　global　free　trade　are　reduced，　In　either　case，　the
option　of　forming　PTAs　does　not　promote　free　trade　at　a　mUltilateral　level．　Rather，　it　results　in　the　fragmenta－
tion　of　the　world　trading　system，　which　is　harmfUl　to　excluded　countries．
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5．2　　Expansion　by　overlapPing　F「As
Mukunoki　and　Tachi（2005）consider　expansion　of　trading　blocs　by　overlapping　FrAs　in　a　three－country
model　of　intra－industry　trade．　The　paper　is　the　first　to　study　dynamic　incentives　to　form　overlappipg　FrAs
and　their　effects　on　the　feasibility　of　multilateral　trade　liberalization．　In　FrAs，　member　countries　can　set　their
external　tariffs　independently　so　that　each　member　has　an　option　to　form　a　new　FrA　with　outside　countries
without　the　consent　of　the　partner　countries．　For　example，　if　Country　A　that　is　a　member　of　A－B　FrA　con－
cludes　a　new　FI’A　with　the　outside　Country　C，　there　emerges　a　hub－and－spoke　system　where　Country　A　is　a
hub　and　Coun頃es　B　and　C　are　spokes．　In　CUs，　on　the　other　hand，　members　must　set　a　common　external　tar－
iff　so　that　they　can　expand　the　existing　bloc　only　through　expansion　by　new　membership，　that　is，　the　simulta－
neous　participation　of　nonmember　countries．
　　Figure　2　represents　welfare　ranking　and　a　possible　dynamic　time－path　expansion．　We　let鵬，協，％，
Ws，and％denote　welfare　by　being　a　hub，　an　insider　of　a　single　PTA，　no　agreements，　a　spoke，　and　the　out－
sider　of　a　single　PTA　respectively．　Suppose　there　are　no　agreements．　Since　the　differences　in　payoff　befbre
and　after　the　formation　is　W，＞W．，the　PTA　between　two　countries（country　A　and　country　B・）increases
welfare　of　the　inside　countries．　By　contrast，　the　bloc　worsens　the　outside　country（country（フ）because
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貼〉％．While　greater　competition　lowers　the　profit　of　firmσin　the　bloc　the　profit　in　the　domestic　coun－
try，　consumer　surplus，　and　tariff　revenue　are　unchanged　as　long　as　markets　are　segmented．　Next，　let　us　con－
sider　incentives　to　expand　a　bloc　between　A　and　B　to　multilateral　free　trade．　We　can　confirm　that　multilat－
eral　free　trade　is　preferred　to　no　agreements　by　all　countries　since琳〉駄．The　trade　liberalization　increas－
es　the　profit　in　f〈）reign　countries　and　consumer　su甲lus　more　than　it　decreases　the　profit　in　the　domestic　mar－
ket　and　tariff　revenμe．　However，　this　may　not　be　true　if　a　PTA　exists．　It　is　obvious　that　an　outside　country
would　like　to　join　in　the　bloc　because％〉▽隔＞W・．On　the　other　hand，　it　depends　on　the　initial　tariff
whether　inside　countries　prefer　multilateral　free　trade．　We　can　confirm　VV，≧協if　the　initial　tariffs　of　three
countries　are　high，　and砺〉縣otherwise．　This　indicates　that　if　expansion　of　a　trading　bloc　takes　the　form
of　new　membership，　it　depends　on　the　initial　tariff　whether　the　expansion　anives　at　multilateral　free　trade．
　　We　altematively　investigate　the　situation　of　overlapping　FrAs．　A　hub－and－spoたe　syste〃z　arises　if　an　out－
side　country（フdoes　not　join　an　existing　bloc，　but　instead　signs　a　bilateral　agreement　with　only　one　member，
fbr　example，　country　A．In　this　case，　country　A，called　a伽わ，　has　two　overlapping丘ee　trade　agreements
with　countries　B　and　C，called　sρokes．　The　FrAs　are　assumed　to　be　supported　by　rules　of　origin　in　order　to
prevent’trade　denection’，　the　situation　in　which　each　product　enters　through　a　hub　country　and　is　trans－
shipped　to　another　spoke．　While　all　countries　can　export　freely　to　the　hub，　only　the　hub　is　treated　duty－free　in
spoke　markets．　We　can　confirm　that　VV．〉協and貼＞VVF．Similal『1y，駄＞W∫and　Ws＞Wo．Hence，　a
hub－and－spoke　system　would　be　preferred　by　the　hub　because　of　its　strong　position．　Though　the　abolition　of
protective　tariffs　decreases　the　profit　of　the　firm　in　the　domestic　country　and　his　tariff　revenue，　it　increases
consumer　surplus　and　the　hub　benefits　from　free　access　to．a　new　partner．　These　gains　dominate　losses。　It　is
obvious　that　the　hub　is　also　preferred　to　multilateral　free　trade　because　the　trade　barrier　between　spokes　gives
the　hub　advantages　in　the　spoke’s　markets．　A　new　partner　is　willing　to　fbrm　the　overlapping　FrA　since　the
profit　in　the　hub　market　and　consumer　surplus　increases　more　than　the　profit　in　domestic　market　and　tariff
revenue　decreases．　Meanwhile，　another　member、B　suffers　damage　in　his　partner’smarket　without　gains　and
therefbre　the　overlapping　FrA　makes　a　victim　of　the　other　inside　country．　The　only　reaction　B　can　take
afterwards　is　to　seek　a　spoke－spoke　arrangement．　Spokes　would　actually　ratify　the　new　FrA　since　the　result－
ing　multilateral　free　trade　brings　1arger　payoffs　than　the　hub－and－spoke　system．
　　The　result　suggests　that　the　option　of　a　hub－and－spoke　system　always　achieves　multilateral　free　trade　as　the
equilibrium　path，　and　it　is　a　unique　equilibrium　outcome　as　long　as　time　discounting　is　not　too　low．
Specifically，　it　is　the　case　when
δ〉δ・畿≡灘
is　satisfied．　Results　suggest　that　FrAs　tend　to　expand　more　than　CUs．　Mukunoki　and　Tachi（2005）also　show
that　incorporating　endogenous　lobbying　activities　by　producers　can　either　enhance　or　hamper　expansion　by
overlapping　FrAs　although　these　activities　always　make　expansion　by　new　membership　less　likely．　In　con－
tra耳t　to　Freund（2000a），　multilateral　free　trade　can　be　realized　even　if　initial　tariffs　are　low　enough　and　the
lower　initial　tariffs　may　make　expansion　by　overlapping　FTAs　more　likely　when　governments　are　very　con－
cemed　about　political　contributions．
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5．3　Building　blocks　under　political　pressures
There　are　analyses　that　explore　the　advantages　of　PTAs’?b秩@worldwide　trade　liberalization，　but　they　are　rela－
tively　f¢w．　B　aldwin（1995）shows　that　new　participation　of　an　outside　country　further　increases　gains　from
participation　and　induces　further　expansion，　which　he　calls　the‘domino　effect’．　Ethier（1998）argues　that　the
progress　of　multilateral　trade　Iiberalization　among　industrial　countries　spurs　a　regional　trade　agreement
between　an　industrial　country　and　a　particular　developing　country，　and　the　agreement　assures　the　developing
country　of　successful　reform　as　well　as　an　inflow　of　foreign　direct　investment　that　improves　domestic　produc－
tivity．　The　reformed　countries　then　come　to　take　a　proactive　stance　on　multilateral　trade　liberalization．　Freund
（2000a）considers　the　firm’s　irreversible　investment　and　shows　that　the　multilateral　free　trade　attained　through
the　PTA　path　gβnerates　greater　world　welfare　than　that　is　realized　through　the　MTA　path．　Her　analysis，　how－
ever，　concentrates　on　the　welfare　comparison　giv．en　the　two　paths　realize　multilatera1　free　trade，　and　does　not
consider　endogenous　f（）rmation　of　a　PTA．　Ederington　and　McCalman（2002）consider　the　situation　where
each　country’s　discount　factor　is　private　information，　and　show　that　a　PTA　promotes　multilateral　liberaliza－
tion　since　countries　are　able　to　signal　their　commitment　to　trade　negotiation　by　their　participation　in　the　PTA．
　　Mukunoki（2005）also　investigates　the　dynamic　time－path　problem　in　a　three－country，　three－good　pe㎡fect
competition　modeL　The　paper　applies　the　political　economy　model　of　trade　agreements　developed　by
Grossman　and　Helpman（1995）。　In　each　country，　owners　of　the　good　in　the　import　sector　decide　whether　they
will　form　a　lobby　and　make　political　contributions．1　compare　two　paths　to　the　realization　of　multilateral　free
trade：nondiscriminatory　trade　liberalization　by　a　multilateral　trade　agreement（the　MTA　path）and　step－by－
step　trade　liberalization　through　formation　and　expansion　of　a　PTA（the　PTA　path）．
　　Figure　3　shows　possible　equilibrium　outcomes．　In　region　NN，　the　equilibrium　outcome　is　no　trade　liberal－
ization　in　both　paths．　In　region　NP，　the　MTA　is　blocked　by　the　lobby　but　the　PTA　is　formed．　The　equilibrium
outcome　is　no　trade　liberalization　in　the　MTA　path　and　preferential　trade　liberalization　in　the　PTA－path．
Although　the　PTA　cannot　attain　MFr，　it　has　an　advantage　over　the　MTA　since　it　can　partially　liberalize　trade
when　the　MTA－path　cannot　liberalize　trade．　The　non－member　becomes　worse　off，　the　world　welfare　is　higher
in　the　PTA－path　in　this　case．　It　should　be　emphasized　that　this　result　has　not　been　explored　in　the．　existing　lit－
erature．　In　region　FP，　govemments　are　free　from　political　pressure　in　both　paths．　The　MTA－path　realizes
MFr　but　the　PTA－path　comes　to　a　dead　end　at　the　preferential　liberalization　in　equilibrium．　The　PTA　is　a
’stumbling　block’in　that　it　can　make　feasible　MFT　infeasible．　Among　them，　Region　NF　should　be　empha－
sized．　In　this　region，　the　MTA－path　evokes　political　opposition　but　the　PTA－path　is　free　from　political　pres－
sure．　Trade　liberalization　via　PTAs　weakens　strong　political　pressures　by　dividing　the　liberalization　process
into　multi－steps　and　different　periods．　The　outsider　of　the　P［『A　also　tends　to　be　free　from　political　influences
since　the　PTA－formation　generates　an　negative　impact　on　the　welfare　of　the　outsider　and　it　raises　the　neces－
sary　amount　of　contribution　the　lobby　must　pay　the　govemment．　Hence，　only　the　PTA－path　realizes　MFr．　In
region　FF，　both　paths　can　attain　MFr　since　neither　the　Pl「A－path　nor　the　MTA－path　faces　political　pressure．
　　The　advantage　of　the凹「A　path　over　the　MTA－path　is　still　valid　even　if　trade　liberalization　in　the　MTA－
path　proceeds　gradually．　Hence，　the　PTA　path　is　free　from　political　pressures　and　attains　multilateral　free
trade，　even　when　the　MTA－path　faces　political　opposition　and　reaches　no　agreements　under　some　conditions．
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Figure　3；Comparison　between　the　MTA－path　and　the　PTA－path
5．4　PTAs　and　multilateral　tariff　co－operation
Another　branch　of　the　literature　examines　how　PTAs　affect　the　level　of　multilateral　tariff　that　is　sustained　in
repeated　interactions　among　countries　wavering　between　cooperation　and　defection．　In　general，　PTAs
increase　the　attractiveness　of　deviation　from　multilatera1　tariff　cooperation．　As　has　been　seen，　however，　PTAs
change　optimal　noncooperative　tariffs　between　members　and　nonmembers　and　alter　the　severity　of　the　pun－
ishment　fbr　deviation．　Thus，　overa11　effects　are　ambiguous．　Bond　and　Syropoulos（1996b）show　that　the　fbr。
mer　effect　dominates　the　latter　and　the　formation　of　CUs　makes　cooperation　more　dificult　while　also　raising
血esustainab豆e　level　of　tariffs．　Bagwell　and　Staiger（1999）suggest　that，　due　to　the　tariff－complementarity
e脆ct　of　PTAs，　a　possible　trade　war　after　PTA　formation　has　less　severe　consequences　for　nonmembers，　so
that　the　nonmembers　may　fail　to　maintain　low　tariffs．　Because　of　the　externality－internalizing　effect　of　CUs，
CUs　realize　more　cooperation　than　FrAs　can．9　Bond，　Syropoulos，　and　Winters（200D　suggest　that　the
progress　of　internal　trade　liberalization　within　CU　changes　the　threat　pOint　in　favor　of　member　countries　and
members　can　obtain　concessions丘om　nonmembers．　The　members　may，　however，　lose　interest　in　mu且tilateral
cooperatlon，
6　1nternal　market　integration
In　parallel　with　the　evolution　of　modern　economics　presuming　scale　economies　and　product　differentiation，
9　Bagwell　and　Staiger（1997a，b）also　show　that　the　formation　of　CUs　resu且ts　in　lower　multilateral　tariffs　in　the　transition
　　　period，　while　the　formation　of　FTAs　leads　to　higher　multilateral　tariffs　in　this　period．
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many　recent　studies　use　impe㎡fect　competition　models　to　study　PTAs．　For　example，　Krugman（1991），　Levy
（1997），and　Goto　and　Hamada（1999）use　monopolistic　competition　models　of　intemational　trade　introduced
by　Kmgman（1980）．　Many　recent　papers　such　as　Krishna（1998），　Yi（1996，2000），　Freund（2000b），　and
Omelas（2004，2005）employ　the　reciprocal　dumping　model　of　intemational　oligopoly　developed　by　Brander
and　Krugman（1983）．　These　analytical　frameworks　seem　appropriate　in　investigating　PTAs　especially　among
developed　countries，　since　many　firms　in　the　countries　have　some　power　to　influence　prices　of　products　that
they　supply，　and　ihtra－industry　trade　is　common．
　　One　of　the　important　effects　accompanying　intra－bloc　trade　liberalization　is　the　integration　of　intemal　mar－
kets．　An　intemational　oligopoly　model　usually　assumes　intemational　markets　are　separated　by　borders，　and
prices　of　the　same　good　can　differ　across　countries．　Under　this　assumption，　as　long　as　their　marginal　costs　of
production　are　constant，　firms　compete　independently　in　different　markets　and　no　changes　of　economic　envi－
ronment　in　one　country　can　affect　the　markets　of　other　countries．　It　is　natural　to　think　that　the　progress　of
trade　liberalization　will　reduce　intemational　resale　costs　and　facilitate　intemational　arbitrages．　As　a　result，
intemal　markets　are　integrated　rather　than　segmented　and　firms　by　no　means　make　price　discrimination．　In
fact，　one　of　the　objectives　of　the　Single　Market　Programme　of　the　EC　is　to　remove　nontariff　barriers　and
move　the　industries　of　EC　members　from　segmented　national　markets　into　a　fully　integrated　market．
　　Although　the　assumption　of　market　segmentation　is　supported　by　some　evidence，Io　recent　studies　indicate
that　intemational　markets　are　moving　slowly　but　steadily　towards　an　integrated　market，　and　the　trend　is
remarkable　among　members　of　PTAs．u　Hence，　it　becomes　increasingly　important　to　incorporate　changes
from　segmented　markets　to　integrated　markets　into　the　analysis　of　PTAs．　Some　studies　consider　market　inte－
gration　and　trade　liberalization　simultaneously　as　the　effects　of　economic　integration　in　the　framework　of
impe㎡fect　competition．　Smith　and　Venables（1988）examine　by　numerical　example　how　the　reduction　in　trade
barriers，　and　the　change　from　market　segmentation　to　fUll　market　integration，　affect　welfare．　Venables（1990）
and　Haaland　and　Wooton（1992）also　explore　the　pro－competitive　or　anti－competitive　effects　of　market　inte－
gration　in　different　settings．　Ishikawa（2004）shows　in　a　monopoly　model　that　under　certain　conditions，　nei－
ther　consumer　nor　the　monopolist　gains　from　economic　integration　when　trade　liberalization　entails　endoge－
nous　market　integration　by　facilitating　price　arbitrages。
　　These　papers，　however，　assume　trade　policies　are　exogenous，　It　is　natural　to　think　that　the　endogenous
integration　of　internal　markets　also　affects　each　government’sincentives　to　set　trade　or　trade－related　policies．
The　relationship　between　endogenous　market　integration　and　endogenous　trade　policy　is　an　important　subject
to　be　explored．
10　Flam　and　Nordstrdm（1995）provide　the　evidence　of　rnarket　segmentation　in　the　European　car　market　during　1982－1992．
　　　Based　on　the　trade　data　of　1988，　McCall且um（1995）has　found　that　trade　within　Canadian　provinces　was　22　times　higher
　　　than　trade　between　Canadian　provinces　and　U．S．　states．
11For　instance，　Wei（1996）and　Okubo（20〔）4）show　that　the　border　effect　in　many　countries　has　been　declining．　Moreover，
　　　the　border　effect　of　Canada　is　now　lower　than　McCallum’s　esti【nate，　using　data　after　the　US－Canada　Free　Trade
　　　Agreement　came　into　force（Helliwell，1998），　price　convergence　is　observed　in　the　EU　car　market（Goldberg　and
　　　Verboven，2005），　and　membership　in　the　EU　reduces　the　effects　of　borders（Evans，2003）．
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　　For　example，　Mukunoki（2004）introduces　internal　market　integration　into　the　argument　of　extemal　tariff
settings　under　Coumot　competition　in　which　products　are　horizontally　differentiated．　Intra－bloc　tariff　elimi－
nation　entails　a　move　from　segmented　to　integrated　markets　fbr　intemally　produced　products，　With　the　inter－
nal　market　integration，　changes　in　external　tariffs　of　one　member　country　influences　markets　in　another
member　country　through　the　effect　that　will　be　referred　to　as　the　sales　a〃ooo’ゴoη罐α．　This　effect　gives　rise
to　a　strategic　relationship　in　extemal　tariff　settings　between　member　countries．　Speci丘cally，　they　become
strategic　complements　of　each　other．
　　Figure　4　depicts　the　ranking　of　tariffs，　whereτN，τ蚕，τグ．，andτκare　the　optimal　tariff　under　pre－FrA，
FrA　without　intemal　market　integration，　FrA　with　intemal　market　integration，　and　the　Kemp－Wan　tariff
which　makes　the　non－member　indifferent　between　the　pre－FrA　and　the　post－FrA　situation，　respectively．　We
haveτざくτダ＜τ”and　hence　intemal　market　integration　increases　the　equilibrium　level　of　external　tariffs．
Besides　that，　whenγ　which　represents　the　substitutability　of　products　is　low　enough（　　Aγ＜γ），we　have
τκ＜τグand　so　the　FTA　with　internal　market　integration　hurts　the　non－member　country．　In　contrast　to
Rjchardson（1995），　who　shows　that　intemal　price　arbitrages　within　an　FTA　bring　about　tariff－reducing　com－
petition，　the　paper　shows　that　internal　market　integration　causes　tariff－increasing　competition　between　mem－
bers．　As　a　result，　the　tariff－complementarity　eff¢ct　of　the　FrA　is　weakened，　and　nonmembers　may　become
worse　off　through　the　formation　of　the　FTA。
Equilibrium　level　of　tariff
τ～ 一一一 一一「
τκ???
τダ
?????
τ§
???
0 A? 1
?
Figure　4：Ranking　of　tariffs
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7　Rules　of　origin
Although　PTAs　remove　trade　restrictions，　some　new　regulations　or　other　protective　measures　can　accompany
the　formation　of　PTAs．　For　example，　many　developing　countries　depend　greatly　on　trade　taxes　as　a　source　of
government　revenue　and　these　countries　may　need　to　compensate　for　the　loss　of　tariff　revenue　as　a　result　of
PTA　formation　by　raising　their　domestic　taxes．　The　increase　in　domestic　taxes　may　offset　the　effects　of　elim－
ination　of　intemal　tariffs　and　make　the　PTA　meaningless（Richardson，1994a）．
Above　all，　Rules　of　Origin（ROO）is　the　most　common　example　of　a　newly　established　regulation．　ROOs
stipulate　conditions　by　which　goods　are　to　be　regarded　as　produced　within　the　FI’A．i2　Since　each　member　of
an　FrA　independently　chooses　its　own　external　tariffs，　were　it　not　fbr　any　regulation　in　an　FrA　and　in　the
absence　of　transport　gosts，　imports　from　outside　of　the　FrA　would　be　made　through　the　countries　with　the
lowest　tariffs，　To　prevent　such　tariff　circumvention　and　trade　deflection，　ROOs　are　indispensable　to　FrAs．
To　qualify　as　originating　within　the　FrA　and　obtain　duty－free　treatment，　ROOs　require　the　product　to　be
either　wholly　obtained　or　have　undergone”substantial　transformation”as　a　manufactured　product．　The　prod－
ucts　are　authorized　to　be‘‘transformed　substantially”when　any　or　all　of　the　following　criteria　are　satisfied：（i）
tariff　headings　of　the　products　are　changed　within　the　FrA（the　change　in　tariff　heading　criterion），（ii）the
products　go　through　certain　production　processes（the　process　criterion），　or（iii）the　products　derive　a　certain
proportion　of　their　value　added　within　the　F　rA（the　value－added　or　percentage　criterion）．
　　The　NAFrA’s　rules　of　origin，　fbr　instance，　require　that　textile　and　clothing　products　exported　to　the　US
must　satisfy　a“triple　transfbmlation”rule　requiring　that　three　transformation　stages（fiber　to　yam，　yam　to
fabric，　and　fabric　to　garment）are　conducted　within　the　territories　of　NAFrA　parties．　They　also　require　62．5
percent　local　content　in　the　automobile　industry．　The　Japan－Singapore　FTA　adopts　the　change　of　tariff　head－
ing　criterion．　The　ASEAN　Free　Trade　Area（AFTA）requires　not　Iess　than　40　percent　of　its　content　have　to
originate　within　member　countries．．
　　It　is　suggested　that　ROOs　pose　significant　administrative　costs．　Herin（1986）estimates　the　costs　of　obtain－
ing　appropriate　documentation　at　3　to　5　percent　of　Free　on　Board　values　of　goods　fbr　the　FrA　between　the
EC　and　EFTA．　NAFTA　devotes　200　pages　of　print　to　the　subject　in　an　annexure　that　deals　with　ROOs
（Krueger，1997）．　Perhaps　due　to　high　compliance　costs，　only　some　Mexican　firms　follow　the　ROOs　and
obtain　duty－free　access　to　U．S．　and　Canada　in　NAFTA（Anson，　Cadot，　Estevadeorda1，　de　Melo，　Suwa－
Eisenmann，　Tumurchudur，2003）．　Under　the“spaghetti　bowl　phenomenon”where　each　country　concludes
many　bilateral　FrAs，　a　complex　web　of　ROOs　and　crisscrossing　tariff　concessions　increase　the　burden　of
administrative　costs　and　require　resources，　which　makes　the　world　trading　system　complex　and　ineffcient．
　　The　imposition　of　ROOs　may　also　lead　to　economic　ineffciency．　In　pe㎡fectly　competitive　markets，　higher
tariffs　with　ROOs　would　reduce　the　overall　welfare　of　an　FI’A，　since　the　loss　in　consumer　surplus　outweighs
12Stdctly　speaking，　ROOs　are　divided　into　two　categories：nonpreferential　and　preferential　origin　rules．　The　former　are　used
　　　fbr　statistical　purposes，　while　the　latter　are　used　to　judge　whether　advantageous　tariff　treatments　should　be　provided．
　　　Preferential　origin　rules　are　divided　into　two　more　categories：rules　on　general　preferential　treatment　for　developing　coun－
　　　tries（i．e．　ROOs　for　the　Generalized　System　of　Preferences）and　rules　relating　to　regional　trade　agreements．
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the　gain　in　tariff　revenue　and　producer－surplus　gains．　Krueger（1．999）points　out　that　ROOs　result　in　an
important　protectionist　bias，　which　stems丘om　distortions　in　the　intermediate－good　markets，　since　ROOs
often　induce　producers　to　use　a　certain　amount　of　intra－bloc　intermediate　goods　even　if　the　prices　f（）r　these
goods　are　high　or　quality　is　low．　Ju　and　Krishna（2005）attribute　the　reason　fbr　noncompliance　of　producers
to　the　price　increases　of　the　intermediate　goods　produced　within　FTA．　Duttagupta　and　Panagariya（2003）add
an　intermediate　input　to　the　Grossman　and　Helpman（1995）model　and　show　that　ROOs　can　make　FTAs
more　politically　feasible　agreements，　although　they　are　welfare－reducing．
　　Some　studies，　however，　suggest　ROOs　may　increase　overall　welfare　when　transshipment　costs　are　signifi－
cant　or　markets　for　intermediates　are　considered（see　for　example，　Krishna　and　Krueger，1995）．　Falvey　and
Reed（2002）assume　a　large　country　and　show　that　ROOs　could　improve　terms　of　trade　of　both　final　and
intermediate　goods，　which　increases　welfare．
　　Compared　with　their　practical　importance，　the　theoretical　as　well　as　empirical　examination　of　ROOs　is　still
in　its　infancy．　In　particular，　most　of　the　analyses　are　conducted　by　assuming　pe㎡fect　competition　in　the　final
good　markets，　and　their　results　are　basically　analogous　to　the　studies　of　local　content　requirements．
　　For　instance，　the　effects　of　ROOs　in　impe㎡fectly　competitive　final－good　markets　or　in　general　equilibrium
settings　are　the　s呵ects　of　future　studies．　For　instance，　Ishikawa，　Mukunoki，　and　Mizoguchi（2005）consider
internal　market　integration　to　investigate　the　effects　of　ROOs　under　international　oligopoly．　We　direct　our
attention　to　the　final　good　market，　rather　than　the　intermediate　good　market．　Even　if　traded　within　the　FrA，
tariffs　are　still　imposed　on　goods　that　do　not　satisfy　ROOs．　As　a　resuk，　an　FrA　entails　market　integration　fbr
intemally　produced　goods，　but　intemal　markets　fbr　goods　produced　outside　the　FrA　are　segmented　in　the
presence　of　ROOs．　In　this　situation，　ROOs　have　two　effects．　Suppose　extemal　tariffs　are　different　between
members　and　the　difference　is　given　byムムOn　the　one　hand，　ROOs　prevent　the　transshipment　of　goods　pro－
duced　outside　the　FrA　from　the　member　with　the　lowest　extemal　tariff　to　other　members　with　higher　exter－
nal　tariffs．　This　effect，　which　we　call　the　anti－circumvention　effect，　hurts　the　extra－bloc　fimls　and　benefits
intra－bloc㎞s．　On　the　other　hand，　the　ROOs　also　prevent　arbitrage　activities　so　that　the　extra－bloc且㎜s　can
make　price　discrimination　within　the　FrA，　which　we　call　the　price　discrimination　effect。　The　effect　benefits
extra－bloc　firms　and　benefits　or　hurts　intra－bloc　firms　depending　on　the　relative　substitutability　of　products．　It
is　shown　that　under　some　conditions，　ROOs　benefit　the　firm　producing　outside　the　FrA　and　hurt　the　firm
producing　inside　the　FrA．　Under　some　other　conditions，　ROOs　benefit　both　firms　at山e　expense　of　con－
sumers．　Overall　social　welfare　of　FrA　members　may　or　may　not　improve　with　ROOs．
Table　1　shows　a　numerical　example．　We　can　confirrn　that　there　actually　exist　the　case　where　ROOs　benefit
The　Substitutability　of
　products　is　identical
　The　substitutability　is　　　　　The　substitutability　is
higher　in　high　tariff　country　lower　in　high　tari肝country
△t　lnside　firm　Outside　firm　lnside　firm　Outside　firm　lnside　firm　Outside　firm
????? 0．000
0．094
0．189
0．285
0．382
0．480
0．125
－0．472
一α946
－1．297
－1．525
－1．629
0．043
0，157
0．272
0．388
0．506
0．626
0．169
－0，445
－0，937
－1．307
－1．555
－1．680
一〇．032
0，043
0，119
0，195
0．272
0，349
0．088
－0．492
－0，948
－1．280
－1．489
－1．574
Table．1：Numerical　Example　of　Profit　Changes（Without　ROO⇒With　ROO）
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both　firms　and　the　case　where　ROOs　hurt　the　inside　firm　but　benefit　the　outside　firm．
8　Concluding　remarks
The　present　paper　summarizes　a　number　of　theoretical　studies　on　preferential　trade　agreements．　It　should　be
emphasized　that　the　theory　of　PTAs　is　of　a　second－best　nature，　and　the　welfare　consequences　of　their　forma－
tion　as　well　as　their　expansion　are　inherently　ambiguous，　In　particular，　PTAs　can　be　either　building　blocks　or
stumbling　blocks　fbr　multilateral　trade　liberalization，　and　they　have　some　additional　effects　on　economic
environment　such　as　intemal　market　integration，　the　imposition　of　ROOs，　and　so　on．
　　Although　theoretical　studies　on　PTAs　are　numerous，　there　is　still　a　room　for　further　research．　For　example，
previous　studies　assumed　that　only　final－good　producers　based　in　member　countries　of　a　PTA　secure　the
duty－free　access　within　the　PTA．　In　practice，　producers　in　nonmember　countries　can　also　get　preferential
access　by　establishing　plants　within　the　PTA　via　f（）reign　direct　investment，　as　long　as　they　comply　with　rules
of　origin．　Also，　producers　of　intermediate　inputs　and　consumers　of　final　goods　can　freely　export　and　import
goods　within　PTAs．　By　considering　a　wider　scope　of　trade　liberalization　and　in　a　multi－layered　stage，　we
would　obtain　some　additional　effects　that　are　overlooked　in　the　existing　literature．　It　is　remarkable　when　mar－
kets　are　characterized　by　imperfect　competition　because　trade　liberalization　may　change　the　economic　envi－
ronment　as　well　as　the　market　structure　each　firm　faces．且3
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